NEXT PAGE -->
|
|
|---|
Updated Daily!
| * * * IN-HOUSE RESOURCES * * * |
|---|
March 4, 2004
REPORT FROM EUROPE: PRECAUTION ASCENDING
by Sandra Steingraber, Ph.D.*
The Precautionary Principle -- those two little words that start conference room brawls on this side of the Atlantic -- is enshrined in the Treaty of the European Union (EU) (also known as the Maastricht Treaty) of 1994.
The idea that we should act to forestall irreversible environmental disasters even before there is strong proof of harm has a long, rich history on the European continent. The Germans first articulated the concept in the 1970s when trying to halt the ongoing death of their forests before all the details about the role of air pollution as a causative agent had been worked out. It was subsequently invoked in the effort to save the North Sea's marine mammal population in the days before zoologists understood how low levels of persistent pollutants can disrupt endocrine systems and suppress immunity.
Not surprisingly, then, the precautionary principle played a starring role in a conference on chemical regulation convened recently in the chambers of the European Parliament.
Its audience was the members of parliament themselves. Held on Dec. 11-12, 2003 and entitled simply "Chemicals: Cleaning Up," this conference was hosted by a coalition of parliamentarians known as the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) group, which is the fourth largest political group in the EU. Serving as a backdrop to the conference was the revolutionary new policy proposal for the regulation of chemicals within the European Union (EU) member states. (Fifteen nations make up the European Union, with ten more to join this summer.) This proposal is called REACH, and its ultimate objective is to create a chemicals policy that is protective of public health and the environment. The seeds of REACH were planted in 1998 when the governments of the EU member states renounced the previous chemicals policy -- a patchwork of 40 different laws -- as "unable to protect people and the environment in a satisfactory way against negative effects." The EU Commission, which is the executive branch of the European Union, was given the task of coming up with an entirely new legislative framework, and in 2001 they did.
At the time of the GUE/NGL conference, a revised version of the REACH proposal had just been submitted by the Commission, and, as members of the GUE/NGL group had feared, many of its original precautionary elements had been largely gutted. Thus, the stated aim of "Chemicals: Cleaning Up" was to examine the draft legislation's new, diminished incarnation, discuss ways in which it needed to be reformed, and strategize about how to achieve these changes. The GUE/NGL group believes that "this new legislation must be in line with the precautionary principle and put health and environmental concerns first."
Because the European Union is the world's second largest economy, the stakes for REACH could hardly be higher. It will, most in attendance agreed, set the agenda for global chemicals policy for the next 15-20 years.
Presenting an historical perspective on the REACH initiative was Per Rosander of the International Chemical Secretariat. (See web addresses at the end of this article.) His organization, headquartered in Sweden, serves as a citizen watchdog for the REACH legislative process. As explained by Rosander, the original REACH proposal has several defining features. One is shifting the burden of proof from regulators to industry. The European expression for this concept is "no data, no market." That is, all producers or importers of chemicals must have sufficient data about their chemicals' safety. To sell the product, the data must be reported. (And thus, the "R" in REACH stands for "registration.") This information is to be shared between producers and users. And the same rules apply for old and new chemicals.
For chemicals sold in large volume and for those of "very high concern," all data must be evaluated by government experts, who may choose, for example, to limit the uses that such chemicals are turned to. (Thus, the "E" is for "evaluation.") For certain chemicals, the evaluators may also decide to require an authorization procedure, by which companies must demonstrate that no safer alternative exists to the material they wish to make, use, import, or sell. This "substitution principle" is, therefore, also a defining characteristic of the original REACH, as is the blacklisting of hazardous substances. (The "A" is for "authorization," which is EU terminology for being granted a permit. REACH thus stands for Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of CHemicals.)
Much of Rosander's presentation was dedicated to explaining the myriad little loopholes and exemptions that have been added to REACH in the last two years and which dilute some of its key provisions to the point of meaninglessness. For example, the provision that compels the substitution of less toxic alternatives for blacklisted chemicals has been all but eliminated. Rosander emphasized that industries are not united in opposition to REACH, as media stories have suggested. Indeed, some companies openly support the proposal, particularly the construction industry, for whom PCBs and other toxic chemicals have been a recurring nightmare of liability and worker hazard. Some industries, however, are staunchly opposed and, together with the U.S. government, have lobbied aggressively against the proposal.[6] REACH, said Rosander, is currently like a house with a strong foundation that has just been burglarized. "The furniture robbed from the house needs to be brought back in." Rosander was optimistic that such restoration was still possible.
Another conference speaker was David Gee of the European Environment Agency, whose charge it is to provide information for public decision-making when the precautionary principle is relevant. Gee gave a very useful overview of what the Precautionary Principle is NOT. One popular misconception, for example, is that the precautionary principle ignores economic costs. Not so, said Gee, but it does factor in externalized costs and the eventual costs of inaction. (Example: screening previously untested chemicals will cost at least $1.6 billion. But the elimination of toxic substances from consumer products is projected to save at least $20 billion in health-care costs over a 30-year period.)
Precaution is also not the same as prevention, argued Gee. Prevention is action taken when substantive proof of harm is available. Precaution is a process of decision-making used when substantive proof is not available. Bicycle helmets prevent head injuries. Ending the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) was a precaution against ozone depletion. Gee pointed out that the first warning about the ozone-eroding effects of CFCs -- which came as a theoretical argument that was openly ridiculed when it was published in 1974 -- became the basis of a U.S. ban on CFCs in spray cans three years later, well in advance of the discovery of an actual ozone hole in 1985.
As Gee's good report, Late Lessons from Early Warnings: The Precautionary Principle 1896-2000, further elaborates, a traditional risk assessment conducted in, say, 1965, would almost certainly have concluded that CFCs were perfectly safe. They are inert, non-flammable, and non-toxic. They had already been released to the atmosphere for more than 30 years without any apparent injury to it. Huge gaps in understanding atmospheric processes -- which have since been partially filled in -- would have prevented mid-century CFC risk assessors from accurately predicting and forestalling harm.
A third speaker, Anja Leetz described the work of Chemical Reaction, an activist group in Belgium dedicated to the proposition that the best chance of reinserting precaution into REACH is by stirring up a public debate. Chemical Reaction provides a website (https://www.chemicalreaction.org) that follows the twists and turns of the legislative process in six languages) and alerts citizens of member states to take action when needed. This group is also engaged in outreach work, lobbying at the European Parliament and the Commission as well as within the eastern European nations that are soon to join the EU.
Underscoring the message of Leetz was a speech by Mette Boye of the Danish Consumer Council. She focused on hair dye as a case study of abject failure to protect consumers against toxic chemicals in everyday products. Not only are its ingredients typically held as trade secrets but allowable levels of toxic substances, in some cases, exceed that permitted for paint. Ironically, said Boye, one of the biggest obstacles impeding a robust REACH agreement is the widespread belief that REACH-like protections already exist. Most people in Denmark assume, she said, that chemicals that reach the market must have been already tested and proved safe. In fact, 95 percent of them have never been tested.
Other speakers from around the continent provided first-hand accounts of precaution in action. Svitlana Slesarenok of Odessa told the story of Mama 86, a group of grandmothers who closed down a death-dealing Ukrainian petrochemical plant through a combination of blockades and lawsuits and, in so doing, created new systems of local regulation. Engineer Roberto Carara described lawsuits against PVC manufacturers in Italy: the verdicts were not what the plaintiffs had hoped, but the publicity generated by the trial educated an entire community about the hazards of vinyl production, and the legal investigation revealed previously hidden data on carcinogenicity.
Later discussion focused on political strategy. Parliamentarians will have opportunities to strengthen the REACH proposal, as there are more rounds in the re-drafting process still to come. But upcoming elections in both the parliament and in the commission this June, as well as the almost simultaneous accession of ten new member states to the EU, made some members ask if passing REACH in its current, weakened state might be preferable to waiting. (Current indications are that the quick-approval option is unlikely, as the political skirmishing over REACH has intensified further since December and threatens to drag on well into 2005.
Whatever the ultimate fate of REACH, it is clear that the precautionary principle is on the political ascent in Europe. It is already the "hot potato issue" in the ongoing campaigns of EU parliamentary candidates, as one conference presenter observed. Moreover, the principle was invoked freely a few days later at another international conference that brought together European environment and health ministers, officials from the World Health Organization, and member organizations of the European Public Health Alliance. This group convened in the Belgian Ministry of Health to plan for the Fourth Environment and Health Ministerial Conference to be held in Budapest in June 2004. With the title of this upcoming summit as "The Future of Our Children," the case for environmental precaution is sure to be made there.
*Sandra Steingraber, Ph.D., is a biologist and author (see Rachel's #565, #658, #776, #777, #784, #785). She is currently a Distinguished Visiting Scholar in the Interdisciplinary Studies Program at Ithaca College in Ithaca, New York.
Useful web sites:
International Chemical Secretariat: https://www.chemsec.org (for the latest developments on REACH)
Chemical Reaction: https://www.chemicalreaction.org (for citizen action alerts on REACH)
Chemicals Policy Initiative, Lowell Center for Sustainable Production, University of Massachusetts at Lowell: https://sustainableproduction.org/proj.chem.publ.shtml
LATE LESSONS FROM PRESSURE-TREATED WOOD
by Sandra Steingraber, Ph.D.
In Rachel's #784, we began tracing the history of CCA-treated wood from 1933 onward. CCA is a toxic and carcinogenic wood preservative, chromated copper arsenate.
The crucial period in the history of CCA was 2001-2002 when citizens all across the country focused on the hazards to children from arsenic-treated wood. In Oakland, California, the Center for Environmental Health (CEH) brought a series of lawsuits under California's famous labeling law, Prop 65. During 2002, major manufacturers of playground equipment and picnic tables capitulated to CEH and agreed to take CCA-treated wood out of their products.
However, after the EPA's (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's) February 2002 decision to phase out CCA-treated wood over a 22-month period, anti-CCA efforts lost momentum for a time.
The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) acknowledged almost immediately that the EPA's phase-out decision would impact its own decision-making.[3] And it did. CPSC's own risk assessment -- released in February 2003 -- showed that children do face a significantly increased risk of cancer from contact with pressured-treated wooden play structures. Nevertheless, the Commission voted, eight months later, to deny a petition by the Environmental Working Group (EWG) and the Healthy Building Network (HBN)[5] to ban the use of CCA wood in play structures and to recall existing structures.
The EPA's action in canceling the registration of CCA, the CPSC argued, would have much the same effect as the requested ban and recall.[6] (This is a little like claiming that the lead poisoning problem was solved in 1978 when paint companies agreed to stop adding lead to their products.)
Julie Hauserman, the Florida reporter who first broke the story on pressure-treated wood and continues to write about the issue, attributes some of the shift in momentum to the efforts of the timber industry. For example, C. Boyden Gray was hired by a leading wood treater at the height of the crisis to fend off government regulation. Gray has intimate ties to the Bush family, having served as general counsel for the first President George Bush. Shortly after Gray came on the scene, Hauserman notes, the EPA, without explanation, delayed the release of its promised risk assessment for children playing on arsenic-treated wood.
A draft of this report was finally released in November 2003 after multiple delays. It, too, showed that the lifetime cancer risk to children who play frequently on CCA structures is elevated. But, by then, the media's attention was elsewhere, and the January 1 deadline for phase-out was only weeks away. The EPA and the CPSC are currently involved in a joint project to look at the effectiveness of various sealants in protecting children from the arsenic in CCA wood -- right now, there are no solid data to support the often-repeated recommendation to seal decks and play structures to protect against exposure -- but these results will not be available until 2005. (Some sealants appear to offer short-term protection but need to be applied every six months and do nothing to stop migration of arsenic into soil from underground posts.) In short, at the present moment, consumers are left to fend for themselves.
What, then, are the late lessons from the early warnings on pressure-treated wood? There are at least three.
1) Citizen science is a powerful tool for social change. Arming parents, journalists, and community activists with arsenic sampling kits, testing protocols, and the address of a reputable analytical chemistry lab has provided indisputable evidence that pressure-treated wood turns back yards and playgrounds into miniature toxic waste sites. Not only did the results of citizen research help compel the EPA to take belated action, it spurred individual communities to respond proactively. For example, two playgrounds in the Buffalo, New York area were closed after testing results were made public. The city of Albany removed all of its wooden play structures after testing was conducted there.
2) Early failure to regulate an environmentally harmful industry makes regulation more difficult later -- even when the scientific case for doing so becomes stronger. Between 1978, when the EPA first announced that it would consider revoking the registration of CCA, and 1988, when it decided not to, the manufacture of CCA wood increased by 400 percent. Regulatory inaction allowed the wood treatment industry to grow exponentially. Now, 26 years later, the EPA has decided to cancel CCA's registration after all. Now millions of back yards and thousands of playgrounds are contaminated with arsenic. And now the industry has the likes of C. Boyden Gray, as well as, most recently, Bob Dole, lobbying on behalf of its interests.
Another early failure to regulate came in 1982 when CCA was granted a special exemption to the hazardous waste rules. This allowed CCA wood to be dumped in ordinary, unlined landfills rather than in hazardous waste landfills -- even though the chemicals in the wood constitute hazardous waste (and did so even by the standards of 1982). This exemption, which persists today, represents an administrative sleight-of-hand by which a hazardous substance is changed into a non-hazardous substance without changing the toxic nature of the substance itself. Had this exemption not been granted, CCA lumber would have undoubtedly remained the specialty product that it had been for decades. It's a safe bet that not many consumers would be lining up to buy pressure-treated lumber if they knew they would have to pay hundreds of dollars in hazardous waste tipping fees when the kids outgrow the play fort. Current projections estimate that between 100 and 400 million cubic feet of CCA-treated wood will be dumped in landfills each year until at least 2016, raising the specter of groundwater contamination.
3) Lawsuits matter. Journalist Julie Hauserman credits citizen lawsuits for helping her make the case in her 2001 expose. "There was a lot of discovery about what the wood industry knew, when it knew it, what the EPA had or hadn't done." Clearly the Prop 65 lawsuits brought by the Center for Environmental Health in Oakland convinced the manufacturers of play equipment and picnic tables that resistance was futile. The environmental group Beyond Pesticides is currently participating in a lawsuit against the EPA in order to end continued use of CCA. A federal judge recently issued an outrageous order dismissing part of the suit, but it remains a legal battle worth fighting and worth watching.
NEXT PAGE -->
|
|
|---|
| * * * IN-HOUSE RESOURCES * * * |
|---|